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COMMENTS
that the courts are hesitant to enlarge the class of purchases for
which the husband can be obligated without his consent.
The courts also employ a ratification theory in examining
the responsibility of the husband who has not expressly consented
to his wife's purchases. These cases have generally involved
purchases of substantial or non-necessary items. In applying
this theory, the courts reason that the husband ratifies by his
silence or inaction his wife's purchases of items which benefit
both spouses or, in the language of the courts, the community.
There is apparently no requirement that the creditor have in-
tended to obligate the husband, and the husband can thus ratify
even a purchase made in the name of his wife. Though the prac-
tice seems proper in a situation where the wife actually intended
to obligate her husband and he was aware of this fact, the rati-
fication theory may work hardship in a situation where the wife
has not intended to obligate her husband and the husband has
regarded the obligation as being the wife's alone.
Finally, it is clear that the courts' use of terminology refer-
ring to community liability does not enhance an understanding
of the basis of the husband's responsibility in those situations
where he may be obligated without his consent. The concept of
community liability developed during a period when the wife
lacked contractual capacity, and the husband's responsibility was
grounded upon his consent as evidenced by his authorization
of his wife's act. Thus, today, as' the wife has contractual capacity
and the courts rightly determine the husband's non-consensual
responsibility by examining directly the factors which give rise
to his liability, it seems undesirable that this analysis be ob-
scured with the language of a now unworkable concept.
George L. Bilbe
ELECTION LAW-THE SECRECY OF THE
ABSENTEE BALLOT
The free and fair election is at the core of any democracy,
and in the United States the secret ballot is a guiding principle
in popular elections. The interest of the general public and the
individual voter in preserving the secrecy of the ballot is great.
The public interest is inherently contrary to vote buying and
other election fraud. Although many of the problems involved
in keeping the secrecy of a ballot intact were cured with the ad-
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vent of the voting machine, the absentee ballot still remains
open to potential violations of secrecy. There are two primary
methods by which the secrecy of an absentee ballot may be de-
stroyed. The first is by placing some distinguishing mark on the
ballot before it is cast so that it may be identified and linked to
the voter after being cast. The second method is by having the
ballots counted other than as statutorily provided. The purpose
of this Comment is to examine the legislation and jurisprudence
surrounding the problems of distinguishing marks and illegal
counting of absentee ballots.
Distinguishing Marks on Absentee Ballots
One of the earliest cases involving distinguishing marks was
Turregano v. Whittington in which some ballots were marked
contrary to statutory requirements2 and others were slightly
mutilated. Some x-marks were placed wholly outside of the space
provided for on the ballot. The court in voiding the ballots con-
cluded that the reason for the provision was to insure the casting
of uniform, non-distinguishable ballots. It was pointed out that
this could only be achieved if it was held to be mandatory." It
should be noted, however, that there were other ballots which
had distinguishing marks which the court apparently felt were
not distinguishing enough to cause them to be rendered void.
The court, therefore, qualified its heretofore unqualified rule by
adding that it sufficed if the voter "honestly attempted to conform
to the statute"4 and if the illegal mark did "not appear to have
been made intentionally. '3 The court's reasoning was that the
average voter was unskilled in the use of the pencil. As authority
it gave common law decisions. This "honest attempt" qualifica-
tion allowed the court to uphold ballots slightly torn and others
with pencil marks extending beyond the space provided for the
x-mark.
Ten years later, in Vidrine v. Eldred,e the definition of what
1. 132 La. 454, 61 So. 525 (1913).
2. La. Acts 1912, No. 198, § 4 required that "Upon receiving his ballot
the voter shall . . . designate his choice by stamping or making a cross, in
ink, or with a lead pencil, in the voting space to the right of and opposite
the name of the candidate he desires to support .... .
3. Turregano v. Whittington, 132 La. 454, 458, 61 So. 525, 526 (1913). The
reasoning was adopted from Hendry v. Democratic Executive Comm., 128
La. 465, 54 So. 943 (1909).
4. Turregano v. Whittington, 132 La. 454, 458, 61 So. 525, 526 (1913).
5. Id.
6. 153 La. 779, 96 So. 566 (1923).
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constitutes a distinguishing mark was significantly expanded.
Perfection in marking the ballot was not required of the voter,
but the language7 used is so strong that it seems to repudiate the
"honest attempt" exception as outlined in Turregano. The court
in Vidrine said that any additional mark capable of identifica-
tion would spoil a ballot, and the only qualification was that the
form of the required x-mark did not have to be perfect. After
this decision, it seems that the requirement was not the apparent
intention that a superfluous mark was meant to be identifying,
but the mere possibility that the mark accomplish that purpose."
Vidrine was strictly followed in Perez v. Cognevich,9 which held
that erasures which were readily apparent invalidated a ballot
because they were "such as might reasonably serve the purpose
of marks of identification""' (Emphasis added).
The next case was Bell v. Guenard," significant because it
totally ignored the "honest attempt" exception of Turregano.
The court dealt with the issue of whether a visible erasure on
certain ballots was a distinguishing mark. It was argued that
it was evident that the erasure was the result of an honest
effort to correct a mistake. The court answered that the intent
of the voter in making a distinguishing mark was known only
to the voter himself and that "[t]he rule ... which is the correct
one to follow is that, if there are such marks or erasures on the
ballot as may reasonably serve the purpose of marks of identi-
fication, the ballot is spoiled .... -12 The court weakened even
more the "honest attempt" exception of Turregano by declaring
that the only other Louisiana case on identical facts was Hebert
v. Landry' which the court believed to be erroneous. Therefore
at this stage of development, the test as to distinguishing marks
seemed to be objective, and the subjective intent of the voter
in making the distinguishing mark seemed irrelevant.
It was at this point in the jurisprudence that Courtney v.
7. Id. at 785, 96 So. at 568: "All these votes we reject .... The law re-
quires that a vote shall be cast by marking with a black lead pencil a cross
mark in the square opposite and to the right of the candidate Intended to
be voted for . . . . Any other way of marking a ballot is not allowed and
spoils the ballot; and any additional mark whatsoever upon the ballot, when
made by the voter, spoils the ballot as being capable of identification." (Em-
phasis added.)
8. See emphasized language in note 7 supra.
9. 156 La. 331, 100 So. 444 (1924).
10. Id. at 344, 100 So. at 449.
11. 194 La. 956, 195 So. 504 (1940).
12. Id. at 971, 195 So. at 509.
13. 193 So. 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
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Abets 14 was decided. The court in Courtney, quoting from Hebert
v. Landry, 5 mentioned above, pointed out that Louisiana Elec-
tion Law' provided a method for marking a ballot, 7 but had
no provision relating to what is or is not a marked or spoiled
ballot.'8 To remedy this situation, the general law of American
jurisdictions, as set out in Ruling Case Law,'9 was adopted. The
Ruling excerpt states that any marks on a ballot, other than
those required by the statutes and the jurisprudence, 20 must do
more than distinguish a particular ballot from another in order
to render the ballot spoiled. For example, a few random pencil
dots on one ballot would distinguish it from another, but would
be insufficient to render it void.21 The court concluded that this
was the sounder view, and although it admitted the existence
of cases to the contrary, it did not name them. No jurisprudence
14. 205 La. 559, 17 So.2d 824 (1944).
15. 193 So. 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
16. Title 18 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes.
17. LA. R.S. 18:349, 1074 (1950).
18. The ballots in question were not absentee ballots, but rather the
paper ballots used before the advent of the voting machine. However, the
law as to marking these ballots applied to absentee ballots, and the law as
to the marking of the old paper ballots still applies to the marking of ab-
sentee ballots. Downs v. Pharis, 122 So.2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
19. "In Ruling Case Law, volume 9, page 1136, under the topic 'Elections,'
it is stated:
"'A distinguishing mark prohibited by the law is such a mark as will
separate and distinguish the particular ballot from other ballots cast at the
election. It is some sort of mark put on a ballot to indicate who cast it,
and to furnish means of evading the law as to secrecy. Therefore, not every
mark made by a voter on his ballot which may separate and distinguish the
particular ballot from other ballots cast at the election will necessarily result
in a declaration of invalidity. If it appears from the face of the ballot that
the marks or writing were placed thereon as the result of an honest effort
on the part of the voter to indicate his choice of a candidate among those
to be voted for at the election and that the voter did not thereby pretend or
attempt to indicate who voted the ballot, the ballot should not be rejected
as to candidates for whom there is a choice expressed, in compliance with
the requirements of the statutes.'" Courtney v. Abels, 205 La. 559, 565, 17
So.2d 824, 826 (1944).
When this excerpt from RULING CASE LAW was cited In Hebert v. Landry,
193 So. 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940), the court added this comment at the end
of the excerpt: "This general principle prevails in this state under our pri-
mary law, as is indicated by the expression of our Supreme Court in Tur-
regano v. Whittington . . . where it Is said that not all distinguishing marks
on a ballot will render such ballot illegal, where no intent is manifested on
the part of the voter to distinguish his ballot from the other ballots cast."
Id. at 408.
20. LA. R.S. 18:349 (1950) requires only that a crossmark, made with
a black lead pencil, be placed in the square opposite the name of the can-
didate to be voted for. The supreme court has said the crossmark may resem-
ble an "x," either in print or in script, but must appear to be a bona fide
effort to make a crossmark. Vidrine v. Eldred, 153 La. 779, 96 So. 566 (1923).
21. None of the cases cited anywhere in this article held random pencil
dots to be sufficient to invalidate a ballot, and this writer's research has
discovered no Louisiana case holding otherwise.
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was expressly overruled,22 either in whole or in part. The court
then held that a marked ballot could be counted valid if it
appeared from the entire ballot that the extra marks were the
result of a voter's "honest attempt" to cast his ballot; that to
constitute a distinguishing mark which will invalidate a ballot,
it must appear that the voter intended it as such.23
Arguments can be made, based on two subsequent cases,
that the "honest attempt" exception of Courtney24 is not as broad
as would appear at first glance. In State ex rel. Dugas v. Leh-
man,25 fifty-one slightly torn ballots were held to be invalid,
although it was not certain whether they were torn by the voters
who cast them, or by the election officials who counted them.
The court held that the ballots were deliberately torn and that
the tears constituted distinguishing marks. In answer to defen-
dant's contention that the tears were not "made by the voters
but rather by the election officials, the court answered that where
there were distinguishing marks on a ballot they would be pre-
sumed to have been "made by the respective voters as distin-
guishing marks." 26
In State ex rel. Harris v. Breithaupt,27 over three hundred-
eighty ballots were held illegal and void, even though it seemed
certain that ink spots which caused them to be voided were the
result of a leaky ink bottle stored with the ballots. Although
the precise issue was whether the ballots were in legal form28
and not whether they were spoiled, the court reviewed the cases
which were concerned with spoiled ballots and said that
"[A]ny ballot which bears any distinguishing mark by
which it may later be identified cannot be accepted. The
rule is well laid down in Bell v. Guenard . . . that, if there
are such marks or erasures as may reasonably serve as marks
of identification, the ballot is spoiled."29
22. This is the nearest the supreme court has come to overruling one
of its own cases on distinguishing marks.
23. Note that the excerpt speaks of the apparent intention of the voter
to mark the ballot, seemingly ignoring the possibility of the mark being put
on the ballot by either the official who provided the ballot or by the com-
missioner who counted it.
24. See note 19 supra.
25. 220 La. 864, 57 So.2d 750 (1952).
26. Id. at 875, 57 So.2d at 754.
27. 220 La. 1042, 58 So.2d 332 (1952).
28. The requirements as to how a ballot is to be printed and as to what
are to be its contents are not set out in LA. R.S. 18:316 (1950).
29. State ex rel. Harris v. Breithaupt, 220 La. 1042, 1050, 58 So.2d 332, 335
(1952).
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Breithaupt in no uncertain terms says that the Bell rule8
is still valid. That the above quotation is dicta is beyond doubt,81
but it has value as insight into the intention and reasoning of
the court. The rule was quoted in concluding a review of the
jurisprudence on marked ballots, and should receive some def-
erence on that account. Proceeding further, the court said that
it drew its conclusions from a reading of Vidrine,8 2 Bell,3 3 and
Courtney,3 4 but chose to quote the Bell rule. No mention was
made of the "honest attempt" exception of Courtney.
The recent courts of appeal decisions have added little or no
clarity to the issue of which is the correct rule to follow. The
First Circuit in one case 5 chose to follow only Courtney. The
Third Circuit, however, in its two most recent decisions, 6 have
intermingled both Bell (and its predecessors)8 7 and Courtney.
While one might therefore conclude that the holdings of all
of the aforementioned Supreme Court cases complement one
another, it is hoped that the foregoing discussion has shown that
there are two fairly distinct lines of cases on marked ballots
which do in fact conflict.8 8
30. See text at note 11 supra.
31. Dupont v. Delacroix, 160 So.2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964), says in dicta
that Courtney probably overruled Bell, despite the language of Breithaupt.
This contention seems to be based partially on a misreading of Breithaupt,
and the Dupont case has never been followed or cited in this regard in any
later case. Cf. Angelle v. Angelle, 204 So.2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967);
Cusimano v. O'Neill, 192 So.2d 147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966). It is submitted
that the contention made in Dupont is erroneous.
32. See text at note 6 aupra.
33. See text at note 11 supra.
34. See text at note 14 supra.
35. Dupont v. Delacroix, 160 So.2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
36. Angelle v. Angelle, 204 So.2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967); Cusimano v.
O'Neill, 192 So.2d 147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
37. See text at notes 6-12 eupra.
38. Generally the jurisprudence is as follows: In line with the theory of
Bell v. Guenard, 194 La. 956, 195 So. 504 (1940), are: Perez v. Cognevich, 156
La. 331, 100 So. 444 (1924); Vidrine v. Eldred, 153 La. 779, 96 So. 566 (1923);
Hendry v. Democratic Executive Comm., 128 La. 465, 54 So. 943 (1911);
State ex rel. Bender v. Delery, 3 So.2d 204 (Orl. Cir. 1941); Crooks v. Cheval-
lier, 156 So. 586 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1934); Jacobs v. Cutrer, 17 La. App. 383, 136
So. 119 (2d Cir. 1930); Owen v. Woods, 8 La. App. 194 (Orl. Cir. 1928); Brantley
v. Smith, 6 La. App. 182 (2d Cir. 1927). In line with Courtney v. Abels, 205 La.
559, 17 So.2d 824 (1944), are: Turregano v. Whittington, 132 La. 454, 61 So.
525 (1913); Dupont v. Delacroix, 160 So.2d 33 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964); Hebert
v. Landry, 193 So. 406 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1940); Nolan v. Martin, 8 La. App.
202 (Orl. Cir. 1928). Cases not dealing with marked ballots but which were
nevertheless concerned with the secrecy of the ballot are Dowling v. Orleans
Parish Democratic Comm., 235 La. 62, 102 So. 755 (1958), and Hart v. Picou, 147
La. 1017, 86 So. 479 (1920). Both of these cases are In line with the objective
reasoning of the Bell case. Three other cases which can seemingly be used as
authority for either the Bell rule (see text at note 11 supra) or the Courtney
rule (see text at note 14 supra) are State ex rel. Dugas v. Lehman, 220 La.
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Certain policy considerations can be summoned in support
of the Courtney rule. The individual's right to vote and have
it counted should be zealously guarded by the courts. Also per-
tinent is the fact that accidental marks can and will be made
on absentee ballots. On the other hand, "the law and the courts
regard the secrecy of the ballot as sacred" 89 and it is arguable
that even the slightest, most subtle mark would suffice as a mark
by which the ballot could later be identified, if he who sought
to identify the ballot knew the type of mark for which he
searched, or its location on the ballot. Furthermore, the dis-
cretion which the "honest attempt" exception gives to the judge
may prove to be a heavy burden on our popularly elected judges.
As can be seen, there are weighty policy considerations on
both sides of the issue of which rule would better serve the
ends of our election law. If the stricter Bell rule is used, then
there will most certainly be cases in which the absentee ballots
of innocent voters will be thrown out because some distinguish-
ing mark was accidently made. If the Courtney rule is used it
would seem that voter fraud would not be discouraged, but
rather such a rule would force the fraud to be refined and made
more subtle. Those wishing to mark ballots for later identifi-
cation would have to try to make their distinguishing mark
appear to be a simple mistake made by a voter in an "honest
attempt" to cast his vote. One should view the alternative in
light of the fact that the possibility is slim that the exercise of
the right to cast an absentee ballot will be discouraged to the
point of abandonment regardless of which rule is chosen. It is
submitted that the Bell rule should be chosen because by it
voter fraud is strongly discouraged because any distinguishing
mark would invalidate a ballot, thereby removing one avenue
for fraud presently open to those who would violate the secrecy
and validity of the ballot.
Finally, it is submitted that the jurisprudence on distinguish-
ing marks is a mass of conflicting authority which could impede
an evenhanded administration of justice in election contests.
864, 57 So.2d 750 (1952); State ex rel. Harris v. Breithaupt, 220 La. 1042, 58
So.2d 332 (1952); and Cusimano v. O'Neill, 192 So. 147 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1966).
Note that Angelle v. Angelle, 204 So.2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967), is not
classified above. It is submitted that the Angelle court, after declaring the
Courtney case to be the fountainhead of marked ballot jurisprudence, did
In fact follow the Bell line in some instances.
39. Cusimano v. O'Neill, 192 So.2d 147, 151 (La. Apip. 1st Cir. 1966), para-




The right to vote is invaluable and should receive the utmost
protection. This right would be better protected by choosing
a rule which more rigorously protects the secrecy of the ballot
and deters voter fraud.
Election Procedure Irregularities
The failure to follow statutory procedure in the counting of
absentee ballots is a problem of fairly recent origin in Louisiana
election law jurisprudence. However, from the first case, it
became entangled with the annulling of elections, a long-standing
problem. So that the reader may more fully understand the dis-
cussion on improperly counted ballots, a brief overview of elec-
tion contest procedure and of the jurisprudence on annulling
elections will be given.
Louisiana Primary Election Law provides that a candidate
may contest an election by claiming that but for irregularities
or fraud he would have been nominated.40 The petition must
set forth the alleged fraud or irregularities in detail,41 and must
show that the results were in fact altered.4 A petitioner may
ask that he be declared elected, or in the alternative, that the
election be declared null and void.48 Practically speaking, suits
to annul an election are brought in only two instances: first,
when a soundly defeated candidate believes he may have some-
thing to gain by dragging the victor through an election contest,
and possibly a new election; and secondly, when a narrowly
defeated candidate could be declared elected if he could succeed
in getting the results of one adverse precinct annulled.44
A wealth of jurisprudence 45 has developed since 1854, the
date of the first attempt to annual a Louisiana election.4 Some
of the allegations of irregularities made by defeated candidates
seeking to have elections annulled have been flimsy at best:
40. LA. R.S. 18:364(b)(1950).
41. Id.
42. Lafargue v. Galloway, 184 La. 707, 167 So. 197 (1936).
43. Dumestre v. Vincent, 144 So. 508 (La. App. Orl. CMr. 1932).
44. E.g., in Womack v. Nettles, 155 La. 359, 99 So. 290 (1924), plaintiff
received 41 votes less than the defendant. Plaintiff sought to have declared
void the results of an entire ward which defendant had won by a 64 vote
majority. Plaintiff failed, but had he succeeded, he would have been de-
clared winner of the election, having then received 23 more legal votes than
his only opponent.
45. For a review of the factual situations presented in some of the more
important cases, see Johnson v. Sewerage Dist. No. 2 of Caddo Parish, 289
La. 840, 120 So.2d 262 (1960).
46. City of New Orleans v. De St. Romes, 9 La. Ann. 573 (1854).
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counting of votes not completed within the time limit;47 polling
place not opened on time;48 failure of polling booth to meet exact
requirements as to size ;49 election commissioners not properly
sworn.50 Obviously it would be manifestly unfair to declare an
election null and void on the strength of the above enumerated
irregularities because the remedy would be too harsh for the
offense. To prevent such an unjust occurrence, the court in
Andrews v. Blackman5 ' formulated the following oft-quoted
rule:
"[I]t is the casting of the ballots, by the legally qualified
electors, unimpeded by force or fraud, which determines the
result .... The parties concerned in a primary election, as
in any other, are the community to be affected, the electors
who participate, and the candidates.... [I]t would be unrea-
sonable to hold, in the absence of an express provision of law
to that effect, that the interest of the community shall be
sacrificed, the will of the electors set at naught, and the
results ... defeated, because, in its accomplishment, or after
• . . the agents under whose direction the election had been
held, have failed to follow each and every formal direction
prescribed for their guidance. '5 2
Perhaps the main reason behind the adoption of such a rule,
other than those mentioned by the court, is that if such irregu-
larities invalidate elections, then "there will never be a valid
election."53
It should be pointed out that this rule was of necessity estab-
lished in the jurisprudence because of the lack of any similar
provision in the statutes. Although the statutes governing Lou-
isiana elections54 consistently use the word "shall" in describing
the procedure to be followed in conducting an election, very few
of the sections make any declaration as to what sanctions result
when the provisions are not obeyed.5 5 The courts have adopted
47. Burton v. Hicks, 27 La. Ann. 507 (1875); Landry v. Ozenne, 194 La.
853, 195 So. 14 (1940).
48. Endom v. City of Monroe, 112 La. 779, 36 So. 681 (1904).
49. Andrews v. Blackman, 131 La. 355, 59 So. 769 (1912).
50. Duncan v. Vernon Parish School Bd., 226 La. 379, 76 So.2d 403 (1954).
51. 131 La. 355, 59 So. 769 (1912).
52. Id. at 364, 59 So. at 772.
53. Id. at 366, 59 So. at 772.
54. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 18:1081 (Supp. 1968).
55. LA. R.S. 18:346 (1950), for example, provides that failure to properly
seal the anachronistic ballot box will render all votes therein void. LA. R.S.
18:1081 (Supp. 1968), on the other hand, although imposing criminal liability
1970]
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the rule set out above and apply it consistently whenever they
are requested to annul an election because of a procedural irreg-
ularity.
Only in a few exceptional cases have defeated candidates
been successful in invalidating an election. The most renowned
of these was Hart v. Picou, 58 in which an election was annulled
because the ballots used were not in the form required by the
statute. It was possible that each vote could have been identified
with the person who cast it, thereby violating the constitutional
provision for secrecy of the ballot.5 7 The court reasoned that
because the object of the statute was to "make effective one
of the main objects of the Primary Election Law and that is that
each voter shall be permitted to cast his ballot secretly," 58 the
statute must be construed as mandatory, and therefore failure
to follow its provisions resulted in the annulling of the election.
Counting Absentee Ballots
Louisiana Election Law provides a method whereby absentee
ballots may be counted without anyone knowing who cast them.
It has happened in recent years, however, that the statutory
counting method has not been strictly followed, with the result
that the secrecy of all absentee ballots involved was destroyed
when they were so counted.
The question first arose in Jarreau v. David,59 where ab-
sentee ballots had been counted in a manner different from that
provided in LA. R.S. 18:1076. The statute provided, in part, that
when absentee ballots are taken from their respective envelopes
during the procedure of counting, they are to be deposited in
the ballot box, without being unfolded or examined. Voting
machines had been used in this election, and consequently there
was no ballot box at the precinct in question.80 The election
commissioners therefore proceeded by reading aloud the name
on any election official who refuses or neglects to perform any of the duties
provided by Part 1 of the Chapter (the absent voter provisions), makes no
provision as to the effect which such a breach of duty shall have on the
votes affected thereby.
56. 147 La. 1017, 86 So. 479 (1920).
57. LA. CONST. art. VIII, § 15.
58. Hart v. Picou, 147 La. 1017, 1021, 86 So. 479, 480 (1920).
59. 74 So.2d 218 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
60. This touches on perhaps the greatest problem in our election law,
i.e., when the statutes on voting machine use were enacted, the provisions
in the prior law which were rendered useless were not simultaneously re-
pealed to prevent such problems as arose here.
[Vol. 30
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of each voter to check his registration in that precinct and to
check whether he had voted at the precinct in person the day
of election. They next tore the identifying flaps off of the enve-
lope, removed the ballot, and, there being no ballot box into
which the ballot could be deposited, read aloud the choice of
candidates made by the voter-almost immediately after the
name of the voter had been read publicly.
Plaintiff sought to have all ballots counted in that manner
declared void, because the method of counting completely de-
stroyed the secrecy of each ballot so counted. The court held
that the method of counting the absentee ballots was not "such
as to prevent a free and honest expression of the will of the
voters" 61 citing Andrews, and dismissed plaintiff's petition.
The court should not have applied the Andrews rule on these
facts. The Andrews rule was formulated to cover situations
where a procedural technicality had been overlooked and where
such irregularity could have no possible effect on the outcome
of the election. Prior to Jarreau, the use of the rule had been
fairly well confined to such situations. In Jarreau, a procedural
irregularity had destroyed the secrecy of every absentee ballot
cast, and the plaintiff sought not to annul the election but to
have only those ballots declared void. The purpose of requiring
the ballots to be put into a ballot box without permitting them
to be examined was to preserve the secrecy of the ballot, and it
follows that the statutory provision is mandatory under Hart v.
Picou, 62 and, under that decision, the ballots should have been
voided.
The validity of the above reasoning was accepted by the
supreme court in Dowling v. Orleans Parish Democratic Com-
mittee,6 3 decided four years after Jarreau. The court said that
the holding of Hart v. Picou applied to this situation.64 The prob-
61. Jarreau v. David, 74 So.2d 218, 220 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
62. 147 La. 1017, 86 So. 479 (1920).
63. 235 La. 62, 102 So.2d 755 (1958).
64. "[U]nder present procedure in localities where voting machines are
used, there being no ballot box, after the envelope containing the absentee
ballot is opened in the presence and view of bystanders and the commission-
ers supporting opposing candidates, as required by law, and after the signa-
ture on the application is compared with the signature on the back of the
envelope and on the voter's registration certificate in the precinct register
and found to be genuine, if the applicant has not appeared in person and
voted at the election, the ballot is unfolded, examined and tabulated by the
commissioners to the benefit of the candidate voted for; and each and every
absentee ballot is thus identifiable. It is obvious that with such procedure
the secrecy of the ballot is meaningless." Id. at 79, 102 So.2d at 761.
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lem "presents a ready-made pattern for vote fraud" said the Chief
Justice, "and constitutes such a serious situation that the matter
addresses itself to the Legislature for prompt correction at its
next session." 65
In 1960 LA. R.S. 18:1076 was amended 6 and the situation was
apparently remedied. The counting procedure was changed so
that the commissioners are required to tear the name-bearing
flaps from the respective envelopes, "leaving the envelopes sealed
and intact. '67 Then after all flaps are removed from all absentee
ballot-containing envelopes, all of the flaps are to. be sealed in
a large special envelope provided specially for that purpose.
After this special envelope is sealed, two commissioners are re-
quired to sign the following certification: "We certify that we
have sealed this envelope before opening any of the sealed enve-
lopes containing the ballots."6 8 After all of this is done, the
anonymous ballot-containing envelopes are to be opened and
the ballots counted.
The matter appeared settled until the decision in Angelle v.
Angelle.6 9 There the absentee ballots in one precinct were
counted exactly as they had been counted in Jarreau. Plaintiff
argued that all ballots so counted were void, having been counted
contrary to the provisions of LA. R.S. 18:1076. The court an-
swered by noting that the same problem had arisen in Jarreau,
and said that they agreed with the Jarreau court that the illegal
counting was "not such irregularity as would destroy the valid-
ity of the election where the electors have had a free and fair
opportunity to express their will, and have so expressed it." 0
Jarreau was decided before the amendment of LA. R.S.
18:1076 and Angelle after. The Jarreau court was faced with an
antiquated statute which did not cover the modern situation.
However, the supreme court had pointed out the problem,71 and
the legislature had remedied it.72 The amended version of LA.
R.S. 18:1076 provided a logical method, consonant with the use
of voting machines, by which absentee ballots could be secretly
65. Id. at 81, 102 So.2d at 762.
66. La. Acts 1960, No. 254, § 2. The Third Circuit has noted that this
amendment was evidently made in response to Dowling. Downs v. Pharis,
122 So.2d 862 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960).
67. LA. R.S. 18:1076 (Supp. 1968).
68. Id.
69. 204 So.2d 581 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
70. Id. at 590.
71. See text at note 64 supra.
72. See text at note 66 supra.
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counted. The amended statute provided in four different places 8
that the absentee ballots were to remain sealed inside their
respective envelopes until the name-bearing flaps had been safely
put away. Admitting the violation, the Angelle court said it had
no effect because it was "not such irregularity as would destroy
the validity of the election." It is conceded that the Andrews
rule would be sufficient to support that holding if applicable,
but as shown before, the supreme court had already made it clear
that the exact situation in Angelle was outside the purview of
the Andrews rule. Rather, the situation was to be governed by
Hart v. Picou, which would demand that LA. R.S. 18:1076 be
construed as mandatory because its provisions directly affect the
secrecy of the ballot. The holding in Angelle, as to LA. R.S.
18:1076, cannot be supported.
Perhaps the holding in Angelle can be explained away as
the result of a loose interpretation of Andrews. In Andrews the
court said that it would not allow the result of an election to be
changed by vitiating the election because of an irregularity which
was innocent and had no effect. It does not follow, however,
that a court should hesitate to declare invalid ballots, the se-
crecy of which was violated, for the reason that to do so would
change the result of the election. An invalid ballot is an invalid
ballot, and its validity should not turn on whether a declaration
of invalidity would affect the outcome of the election. This, it is
submitted, is what the holding in Angelle, erroneously, does.
Other States
At least ten other states have statutes74 which provide
73. LA. R.S. 18:1076 (Supp. 1968) provides in part that after it has been de-
termined that the voter has not voted at the polls on election day, "the flap
shall be torn from [his absentee ballot-containing] envelope, leaving the
envelope sealed and intact. After the proper entries have been made, and
all flaps removed, the flaps shall be gathered together and placed in an en-
velope provided for that purpose, which shall bear the following certification
.... 'We certify that we have sealed this envelope before opening any of
the sealed envelopes containing the ballots.'" Spaces for the signatures of
two commissioners are provided directly after the certification. The statute
then continues: "[a]fter the flaps have been placed in the envelope it shall
be securely sealed. The commissioners shall open the sealed envelopes con-
taining the absentee ballots and shall then count the votes thereon and
tabulate them ......
74. N. Y. ELECTION LAW § 204 (McKinney 1949); CAL. ELECTION CODE §§
18231-18235 (Deering 1961); PENN. STAT. ANN. 25:3149.7 (Purdon 1965); FLA.
STAT. ANN. 9:101.68 (West 1959); DEL. CODE ANN. 15:5516 (West 1953); T x.
ELECTION CODE art. 5.05(6) (Vernon 1951); N. J. STAT. ANN. 19:57-24, 57-31
(1940); MO. STAT. ANN. § 112.060 (Vernon 1959); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 54, §§
94, 105A (1953); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 46, § 19-9 (Smith-Hurd 1944).
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for a method of counting absentee ballots almost exactly like
the present Louisiana method. However, the problem of what is
the effect of a failure to follow the statutory system of counting
the absentee ballots has rarely arisen.
In an Arkansas case75 in which the ballots were counted im-
mediately after the name of the voter was publicly read aloud,
the court refused to exclude the ballots. Although the court
admitted that the secrecy of each ballot was destroyed, it said
that it was required to follow the Arkansas rule that "nothing
will justify the exclusion of the vote of an entire precinct except
the impossibility of ascertaining for whom the majority of the
votes were given.""0 (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, only Texas and California have had cases touch-
ing the vote counting problem. In two cases,77 the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals held that if an absentee ballot were taken out
of its anonymous inner envelope immediately after that envelope
was taken out of the name-bearing outer envelope, the enclosed
ballot would be void because its secrecy had been destroyed.
In a well-reasoned California case,78 the election officer who
opened the ballots knew how each absentee voter voted; and
furthermore, each ballot was put directly back into the envelope
which bore the name of the voter. The court voided the ballots,
holding that "the secrecy of these particular ballots was de-
stroyed. ' 79 It pointed out that a solution had to be drawn from
conflicting rules. On one hand it was noted that "courts are re-
luctant to throw out votes where it can be told for whom the
vote was intended and where the irregularity complained of is
that of one of the election officials for which the voter is not to
blame."80 Added to this was the awareness that "courts have
been very indulgent respecting the omissions, inadvertencies,
and mistakes of officers of elections, lest by exacting of them a
technical compliance with the requirements of the law the citi-
zen might be deprived of a sacred right."' On the other hand
there are "statutes ... designed to carefully protect the absent
75. City of Newport v. Smith, 236 Ark. 626, 367 S.W.2d 742 (1963).
76. Id. at 632, 367 S.W.2d at 746.
77. Brandon v. Quisenberry, 361 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); Mitchell
v. Jones, 361 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
78. Scott v. Kenyon, 16 Cal.2d 197, 105 P.2d 291 (1940).
79. Id. at 201, 105 P.2d at 293.
80. Id. at 202, 105 P.2d at 294.
81. Id. at 203, 105 P.2d at 294.
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voter in his right to a secret ballot, which is the very foundation
of our election system. 82
Faced with these two valid but conflicting considerations,
the court said,
"The law permitting absent voting is carefully drawn to
protect the voter in the secrecy of the ballot, and it would
be largely useless if such secrecy is not maintained ... While
it is unfortunate that any voter should lose his vote when
it can be told for whom he intended to vote, it would be
equally or more unfortunate to deprive many others of their
vote by holding that a substantial compliance with this law
is unnecessary. To so hold would be to destroy, by judicial
decision, the secrecy with which the law has surrounded
the casting of such ballots."83
The logic and reasoning of the California Supreme Court
are quite persuasive and should have even greater applicability
where the illegal counting is a fraudulent scheme rather than
a mistake. The object of the elaborate election law provisions
covering the counting of absentee ballots could only have been
intended to protect the secrecy of the absentee ballot and deter
voter fraud. A further problem arises in Louisiana resulting
from our lack of statutory direction as to what is to be done
to ballots counted illegally. California statutory law also had
no such provision. However, the California court realized that
to void absentee ballots illegally counted has not merely the
short-term effect of depriving the voters concerned of their votes
but also of preserving the secrecy of the absentee ballot for all
voters in all elections to come-by warning both the innocent
and the fraudulently motivated election official of the strict sanc-
tion applied against illegally counted ballots. It is submitted that
the Louisiana jurisprudence should bow to this weightier con-
sideration.
Allan L. Durand
82. Id. at 201, 105 P.2d at 29&
83. Id. at 203, 105 P.2d at 294.
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